One part of one chapter of my dissertation is on the ethics of resistance. Let me post what an abstract for this may look like. It has very little to do with the Romero material, other than the fact that I see Romero as one of those people practicing the ethics of resistance in their context. So, the theory that follows can be seen to lay the groundwork for how I would interpret Romero's ministry.
I propose to pursue the connection between ethics and religion in the move from the modern to the postmodern. Specifically, I will show how postmoderns work to develop an ethic of resistance which focuses on otherness and difference, which is in contrast to the modern development of a universal ethic. One cite where we can see this development is in the use of religion in the postmodern. This paper, then, makes two moves. First, I look to the recent work of David Tracy on the fragment as a way of explaining the move from the modern to the postmodern and the way that religion functions in this move. Second, I show how Tracy’s theological focus on the fragment shares a way of thinking with Jacques Derrida. This shared way of thinking is pursued through what I call an ethics of resistance, which is developed in conversation with the religious. Ultimately, we see in Tracy and Derrida the use of religion to fight the modern impulse to totalization through the development of an ethics of resistance.
I begin with the theological work of David Tracy, focusing on his most recent which takes up the question of naming and thinking God. Tracy shows how the theologian must move from the attempt to totalize God with hegemonic forms (a la modernity) to the search for forms that allow for the interruptive and disruptive nature of God. For Tracy, this form is found in what he terms the fragment. Fragments are those ways of thinking that are part of a tradition that call that tradition into question, disrupting the thinking taking place. For Tracy, fragmentation is the postmodern situation. As such, the fragment does not long for a new totalizing discourse; rather, the fragment shows the breaking apart of any totalizing discourse. Thus, the discourse for God that offers systematic structures which “box” God are inadequate. Rather, we need forms which allow the impossibility of naming God (a la Augustine) to come to the fore. For Tracy, this means theology must recover the underside of its own tradition, those voices that have been silenced or ignored in the past; it is these voices that show the calling into question of many of the hegemonic forms that parade as names for God today. In a similar way, religion acts as that force that calls into question the modern way of thinking. Thus, Tracy simultaneously shows the limits of modern thinking as well as systematically inclined theological endeavors.
For Tracy, though, the fragment does not act as a strictly deconstructive moment; rather, there must be reconstruction. This is accomplished through a “gathering of the fragments.” The gathering works as a way of bringing together disparate claims about God; often these are in disagreement with each other. However, by turning to the gathering, Tracy allows these fragments to “live-in-difference.” The gathering does not allow the fragment to become one more totalization because it exists within the gathering that always allows the fragment to be called into question, deconstructed, etc. Thus, the gathering of fragments, allowing them to live-in-difference, turns into an ethics. This ethics acts as a moment of resistance to those forms of thinking that preference hegemony and totalization; rather, in the postmodern, we must allow this living-in-difference.
Here, it is necessary to turn to the explicitly ethical work of Jacques Derrida, as Tracy does not develop an ethics as such. Tracy’s work opens the way of thinking for theology that allows for this Derridean turn through the living-in-difference promulgated by the gathering. The turn to Derrida is a move to his notion of deconstruction as doing justice to the other, that doing justice is deconstruction. Derrida develops this notion of justice in contrast to the idea of law. He says that law is founded on an act of violence, set up as a totalizing structure to restrict the way of being of inhabitants under a law. It is an explicitly Enlightenment/modern way of thinking. Derrida says, however, that the notion of justice deconstructs law because the law’s focus is not justice—even thought it says it is—but is sameness and cohesion. Derrida says that justice deconstructs law by calling into question by preferencing the other through hospitality; and for Derrida, both justice and hospitality are thought through religion (specifically Abraham). This causes a rethinking of the very nature of law, politics and morality, by saying that the just action is not law, but a turn to the other, being open to this other. Thus, justice resists law, showing law its inherent limitations while also showing a more “ethical” way of being. In Derrida, then, we see the explicit development of this ethics of resistance through the preference of justice.
Thus, we see that the theological endeavor of Tracy and the work of Derrida develop an ethics of resistance. This ethics acts as a way of both opening the postmodern to the religious because the religious is used as that which resists the totalizations of modernity. Rather, the religious becomes the impetus for the development of an ethics of resistance; both through the gathering offered by Tracy and the justice pursued by Derrida.
Gonna make me a home out in the wind
1 hour ago